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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
CALDER BROTHERS CREAMERY
CO~IP .A.NY, a corporation, and THE
COMMISSION OF FINANCE OF
UTAH, Administering The State Insuran<!e Fund,
Plaintiffs,

No. 7275

vs.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH ·and CHARLES ·M.
JAMES,
Defendants. ,

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF
STATEMENT
Charles ~I. J a1nes \Yas injured in a gas explosion
\rhich ·occurred on N oven1ber 6, 1939, while he was in
the etuploy of Calder Brothers Creamery Con1pany at
, . . ernal, Utah. The eu1ployer 's \Yorlnnen 's con1pensation
insuralH'f \Yas rarric<l in the State Insurance Fund. Mr.
1
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James was in the hospital for son1e time after the accident and \vas under doctor's treatment for a considerable
period of tilne. There "ras no question about the accident being eo1npensable, so the State Insurance Fund
paid all of the n1edical and hospital bills for his treatnlent and paid hin1 co1npensation in accordance wi,th the
provi~ions of the \Vorkn1en 's Con1pensation La\v in force
at the tirne of his accident. The State Insurance Fund
continued to Inake cornpensation payments to Mr. J runes
until the sununer of 1948.
The question \Yas raised, ''rhether Mr. James \vas
still disabled and, consequently,- whether he could be considered as "permantently and totally disabled." The
Industrial Commission held a hearing at Vernal, Utah,
on October 7, 1948, after having previously notified all
of the parties concerned. At the comn1encement of the
hearing the presiding commissioner stated that the hearing \Vas being held to detern1ine the present disability
of ~1r. James and to consider the rna tter uf whether
he is qualified to participate in the benefits of the Combined Injury Benefit Fund. The reason why the Combined Injury Benefit Fund could be involved in the case
'vas because ~1r. James had lost his left leg by amputation ",.hen he was fifteen years of age, which ..was many
years before his accident in November, 1939.
On N oven1ber 4, 1948, the Industrial Conunission
rendered its decision in which it held that Mr. James was
pern1anently and totally disabled, although the evidence
at the hearing sho\ved that he had been working at a
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steady job for about three yen r~ pr1or to the hearing
and had been Pnrning a regular \Yagp of $160.00 n n1onth.
In its decision of ~oYenlbPr -l-, 1948, thP Industrial
Conunission ordered both the State Insurance Fund and
the Co1nbined Injury Benefit Fund to pay con1pensation
to ~1 r. J an1es at the rate of $8.79 per ''reek. On November 9. 1948, the State Insurance Fund filed \vith the Industrial Conunission an application for rehearing, in
w·hich the Conunision 's attention \vas called to several
error8 contained in the decision.
On ~oven1ber 16, 1948, the Industrial Cornmission,
,,-ithout holding any further hearing and vvithout giving
any notices to any of the parties, issued an amended
decision in "\Vhich it rnade aln1ost exactly the same findings
and conclusions and orders as were contained in its Novenlber 4, 1948, decision, insofar as the State Insurance
Fund was concerned~ but in the an1ended decision the
Industrial Co1nmission elin1inated any order for the Combined Injury Benefit Fund to n1ake any payn1ents to lVIr.
James.
On N oven1ber 18, 1948, the Industrial Con11nission
denied the application for rehearing \:vhich had been filed
h~- the State Insurance Fund on N oven1ber 9, 1948. A
\V rit of Certiorari \Y·as obtained fron1 this Court on
Decen1ber 17, 1948, directing the Industrial Commission
to send its record to this Court on or before January
6, 1949, for revie,v, "Thich has been done.
In the n1eantin1e, although

"-e

n1aintain that the
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Industrial Co1nmission did not have any authority or
jurisdiction to issue its Arnended Decision of N'o:vember
16, 1948, \VP filed another application for rehearing with
the Industrial C'o'lnmission on December 15, 1948, so as
to be on the safe side fron1 a procedural standpoint. On
Decen1 ber 29, 1948, the Conunission attempted to grant
a rehearing, but has not proceeded further in the case
since sending its record to this court on January 6, 1949.
QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW
There are t'vo 1nain questions involved in this case.
The first question is whether an injured employee can
be classed as being ''permanently and totally disabled,''
vvhen he has not lost ce:r:tain specified members of his
body and has not con1pletely lost the use of said members
and he has been gainfully employed for a period of three
years. The second question involves the Industrial ComJnission's jurisdiction and procedure relating to applications for rehearing.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
CHARLES M. JAMES CANNOT LEGALLY BE
A \VARDED COMPENSATION FOR "PERMANENT
rrOTAL DISABILITY" FOR A PERIOD WHEN HE
IS CONTINUOUSLY EMPLOYED AND EARNING
SUBSTANTIAL \\rAGES IN THAT EMPLOYMENT.
The provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act
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relating to pern1aneut total disability, as it was in force
in ~ove1nber. 1939, 'vhen ~lr. Jan1es had the accident
involved in this easP. reads as follo,vs:
Section 4:2-1-63.
In eases of pern1anent total disability, the
award shall be 60 per cent of the average weekly
'vages for five years from date of injury, and
thereafter 45 per cent of such average weekly
"'rages until the death of such person so totally
disabled, but not to exceed a maximu1n of $16
per week, plus 5 per cent of such a'vard f·or each
dependent minor child under the age of eighteen
years, up to a maxin1um of five such dependent
minor children, and not less than $7 per 'Yeek.
The loss, or pern1anent and complete loss of use,
of both hands or both arn1s, or both feet or both
legs, or both eyes, or of any t'vo thereof, shall
constitute total and perinanent disability, to be
compensated according to the provisions of this
section.
One of the n1ost recent cases in vvhich the Utah Su-.
pren1e Court interpreted and applied the provisions of
the foregoing section 'vas Johnson vs. Industrial Com?nission, 9:3 Utah 493, 73 Pac. (2nd) 1308. In .that case
Ephrain1 Johnson elain1ed that he vvas permanently and
totally disabled. He alleged tha{ he was not able to do
any n1anual labor without suffering considerable pain.
The Industrial Co1nrnission a'Yarded him 200 weeks com-pensation for his permanent partial disability. Mr. Johnson's attorneys then took the case to the Supreme Court,
which held:
"Plaintiff's condition does not fit into the
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cla~Rification

(l< scrih<•(l in the last sentence of
Seetion 42-l-63, R. S. Utah 1933: that is, there
\Vas no permanent and con1plete loss or loss of
use of both arn1s so that he\vould be pern1anently
disabled as a Tnatter of la\v. It 'vas then for 1he
connnission to decide- fron1 all the facts and cirruinstances In evidenre 'vhether he "~as so dis1

abled~

*

*
*
rrhe e·vidence does not compel a finding of
total pern1anent disability and does support the
aw'ard as 1nade. ''
Anoth€~r

decision of this Court containing a discussion relating to permanent total disability was Babick vs.
Industrial Conunission, 91 Utah 581, 65 Pac. (2nd) 1133.
lVIr. Babick received an injury to his spinal cord, 'vhich
caus(~d sun1e of the n1uscles of each leg to be partially
paralyzed and this resulted in so 1nuch disability in the
legs that he 'vas unable to engage in his previous occupation as a 1niner or in any other occupation of similar
character. He also stated that he was unable to remain
in one position for very long ~rithout suffering pain.
The various doctiors W'ho testified in the case gave their
estiinate of his disability varying from 507o to 757o and
they 'vere all agreed that he could not engage in mining
or any occupatioi1 requiring heavy n1uscular labor. v\Tith
these facts before it, the Supre1ne Court sustained the
con1n1ission 's denial of con1pensation to Babick as a
per1nanent total disability. In giving its reas~ons for
sustaining the commission, the Court differentiated the
case fron1 the Caillet case, ·go Utah 8, 58 Pac. (2nd) 760,
and soine,vhat n1odified the Caillet decision. On the last
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Court'~

page ·of the
guage:

opinion

i~

found thP follovving lan-

In the Caillet Case, the applicant had one
hand off and tvYO fingers of the other hand amputated ahnost to the \Yrist, "Thich gave hin1 100
per cent loss of function of Ol).e hand and 60 per
et•nt of the other. The evidence shovved that his
ability to do any \vork substantially remunerative
'vas so neglig·ible as to approach the vanishing
point. i\loreover, the opportunity to secure the
very fe\v types of \York he could do was nil.
Perhaps the language from that case above quoted
is a little too inclusive. It would fi~t the person who
had one leg or an arm off. A vvorkman who had
done manual labor who l~ost an arm or leg could
not ~ perfor1n the \Vork of the general character
that he \vas perforn1ing vvhen injured,'" and yet
under a strict following of this· rule he would
establish a prin1a facie case. In the first place,
the rule was not meant to operate in any case
·w. here specific con1pensation for a loss of a member or loss of function of a n1ember was provided
by statute for permanent partial disability. In
the second place, even where the loss of function
is such as ~to come between that zone limited on
the one side by section 42-1-63, R. S. 1933, n1aking
certain losses, in law, total and permanent disability, and, on the other side by cases vvhich
can be said in law involve only partial permanent
disabilities (to be determined) by the general
paragraph of section 42-1-62, where the eonnnission must fix it in proportion to the fixed coinpensation nan1ed for definite losses, the old rule
applies that \Ye vvill not disturb the cornmission's
judgment in such case unless it is arbitrary."
H

We are aware of the provision of Section 42-1-79
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that the Industrial C·ommission 's findings and conclu~ions on factual questions are co~clusive. But the Supreine Court on n1any occasions has held that this rule
n1ust be 1nodified to the extent that the Industrial ComInission 's findings and orders muS:t not be arbitrary or
capricious. If they are arbitrary or capricious, they will
not be sustained. The Court has . also gone further and
held that the Industrial Comn1ission's findings are_ arbitrary and· capricious if they are contrary to the undisputed evidence in the case. ..A. fe'\\r such cases are:

Kavalinakis vs. Ind. Comm., 67 Utah 174, 246
Pac. 698.
Harness vs. Ind. Comm., 81 Uta:h 276, 17 Pac.
(2nd) 277.
Norris vs. Ind. G'omm., 90 Utah 256, 61 Pac.
(2nd) 413.
Tintic Standard Mng. Co. vs. Ind. Comm., 100
Utah 96, 110 Pac. (2nd) 367.
'Ve n1aintain that the Industrial Commission'~s findings that Mr. J an1es is per1nanently and totally disabled
is contrary to the undisputed evidence in the record and
1s, therefore, arbitrary.
~lr.

J a1nes testified that after his accident on Noveinber 6, 1939, at Calder Brothers Creamery he was
co1npletely disabled for one year and a half, but later he
did reeover fro1n his injuries to a certain extent ( Tr. 4,
5, & 6). \~Ve briefly quote his testimony, (Tr. 5):
Q.

A.

Do you figure you are totally disabled?
I have practically lost the use of my right
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arrn at this shoulder: I can't use it. \Vhen a 1nan
has onP h•g and on~ arn1 g·one, he is totally disabled.
Q. Is it your opinion that you are totally
disabled'?
. .--\. I can still n1ake a living if I have to,
soine,vay or the ~other. I think I am still entitled
to son1e consideration.
Q. ,,~ e are trying to find out \vhat your
present disability is, and I asked you \Vhether in
your opinion you are totally disabled.
A. vVell, no, I 'vould not say so. They figure
if a fellow is totally disabled he n1ust be flat on
his back.
,.

The n1ost disabling result of his 1939 accident appears to be in his right arm and hand (Tr. 5, 7, 8 & 9).
vVith the loss of his leg from his boyhood accident, there
is no doubt about hin1 being considerably handicapped in
his work. But the fact ren1ains that he has been continuously employed for a per~od of three years prior to the
Co1nn1ission's hearing of October 7, 1948, receiving a
"rage of $160.00 per month, 'vhich is aln1ost twice the
an1ount of the wage he \vas being paid by Calder Brothers
Crea1nery at the time of his 1939 accident. (Tr. 11, 12,
15 & 16.) Mi·. James does janitor 'vork, takes tickets at
the theatre and does general work around the auto court,
such as 'vatering lawns, etc.
The fact that Mr. James' present en1ployer, Mr.
Feltche, has been acquainted \\Tith him since they were
boys together, was stated by the Industrial Commission
to be the main reason w·hy ~fr. Feltche gave him his
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present job. The Con1tuission therefore concluded that
~1:r. J a1ne~ \\'as per1nanently and totally disabled, regardless of his present e1nployn1ent.
It i~ not of any particular in1portance how or why
lvlr. ~J arr1es procured his present job. The thing V\rhich is
of importance is 'vhether or not he is able to work. In
other 'vords, if he is satisfactorily performing the duties
of the job vvhich he has held for the past three years,
clearly he is not '' per1nanently and totally disabled.'' No
doubt, friendship pro1npts many employers to give a.
friend or acquaintance a job, 'vhether they are disabled
or not. According to ~the undisputed testimony in the
case, Mr. J a1nes is certainly not a charity case. Mr.
Feltche is receiving satisfactory service for the money
'vhich he is paying Mr. J an1es as his employee, and he
so testified at the hearing. (Tr. 16.)
In the Industrial Commission's decision of November
4, 1948, and also in its amended decision of November
16, 1948, the Con11nission stated "that it is doubtful
'vhether the applicant could find any employment with
his present disabilities if he were to lose his present
job." \\7 e do not feel that the Industrial Commission's
doubts and fears as to wha~t could happen to Mr. J an1es
in the future should properly be included in its findings
in the present status of this case. Mr. J an1es is no'v
gainfully employed and has been so employed for three
years. There was no evidence in the record that he was
not going to remain continuously employed doing the
same work for his present employer for an indefinite
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time in the future. If at any time i11 the future l\!lr.
James' condition changes "rith respect to his ability to
perfornt the \Vork he i~ no\Y doing. or \Yith respect to his
ability to procure or perfornl n11y other \York \vhich he
might atternpt to obtain and perforn1, then under the
Industrial Conunission 's continuing jurisdiction the case
might properly be reopened to determine w·hat his disabilities at that ti1ne n1ight be, nnd \vhat co1npensation
he 1night at that ti1ne be entitled to receive, and ''"het.her
he should receive such cornpensation fron1 the State Insurance Fund or fron1 the Cornbined Injury Benefit
Fund.

The original decision issued by the Industrial Com~
111ission on N,oYeruber 4, 1948, after a preliminary recital
as to ho\v the case can1e on for hearing, contained the
follo\ving findings, c·onclusion and orders :
FINDINGS
''After hearing the testin1ony in the case and
reviewing the same as set forth in the transcript~
and other docun1entary evidence received and
made a part of the record, the Cornn1ission finds
that the applicapt sustained an injury by accident
arising out of or in the course of his employment
on the 6th day of November, 1939; that as a result
thereof he suffered certain disabilities, and on
June 6, 1941, the Industrial C~ommission found
the applicant to be 1007o permanently disabled,
and recomn1ended that cornpensation be paid to
the applicant for the ren1ainder of his life; the
State In~urance ·Fund has since been making
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regular co1npensation payments to the applicant
on this basis ; the Industrial Con1mission nO'\Y
finds that the applicant is still pern1anently and
totally disabled because of the injuries received
on N ov<·Inber 6, 1939, i.e., partial loss of hearing,
partial loss of use of both of his hands, partial loss
of vision and stiffness in his shoulder and neck and
bad ~cars on his £ace in addition to the loss of his
left leg near the hip due to a forn1er injury; that
his present en1ployn1ent is due very largely to 'the
life long friendship that has existed between the
applicant and his present employer; that it is
doubtful \\rhether the applicant could find employlnent \vith his present disabilities if he were to
lose his present job.
The Connnission further finds that the applicant suffered an injury when he was fifteen
years of age, causing hin1 to lose his left leg about
five inches belo\\r the hip.
In vie"r of the fact that the applicant sustained these t\vo disabling·. injuries, and under
the provision of Section 42-1-65, Utah Workmen's
Compensation Act, the Industrial Commission
concludes that the applicant Charles -M. Jan1es is
enti~tled to the benefits from the Combined Injury
Benefit Fund for the_ rest of his life, said conlpensation to begin October 8, 1948; that he should
be paid the sun1 of $8.79 per \Yeek fron1 the Con1bined Injury Benefit Fund during the ren1ainder
of his life.
IT IS TI-IEREFORE ORDERED that The
State Insurance Fund continue to pay conlpensation to the applicant as heretofore paid.
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the
Secretary of the Industrial Conllllission place the
name of Charles M. J au1es upon the list of permanent totals \vho are entitled to participate in
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the En1ploype~' Co1nbined Injury Benefit Fund,
and that con1n1encing a~ of October 8, 1948, benefit~ be paid Cha.rlps l\1. J a1nes at the rat~ of $8.79
per \Yeek, during the ren1ainder of his lif~. ''

In the

Conunis~ion '~

..t\1nended Deeision of N ovembei~ 16, lD-±8, the sn1ne findings \Yere 1nade, but the conelusions and orders elirninated any reference to the
Cornbined Injur~· Benefit Fund, "·ithout changing the
part~ of the XoYeinber 4th decision relating· to the State
Insurance Fluld, as follo\YS :
~·In

Yie"· of the fact that ~the applicant sustained these t\YO disabling injuries, and is no"r
totally and permanent!~· disabled, the Industrial
Co1nmission concludes that ~the applicant Charles
.Jl. J a1nes is entitled to the benefits under the
''; orkmen 's Con1pensation Act.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that The
State Insurance Fund continue to pay compensation in the amount of $8.79 per \veek to the applicant as heretofore paid.''
Both the original decision and the an1ended decision
entunerate the various disabling injuries \Yhich Mr.
_James no\\T has, ~among then1 being the loss of his left
leg \Yhich occurred \Yhen he \Yas fifteen years of age.
The Com1nission concluded in both the original decision
and in the amended decision that Mr. Jan1es is novv
totally and pern1anently disabled as the result of the
injuries he received in both the accident of 1939 and the
accident \Yhen he was fifteen years of age. In neithe,r
of its deci-sions did the Connnission nzake a finding o1·
conclusion as to ttvhHt is the extent of the applicant's
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d,isab ility resulting front the injuries he received in 1939
alo11e. It is illegal and erroneous for the Industrial Comnlission to 1nake a finding or conclusion that Mr. James
i~ per1nanently and totally disabled by reason of the injuries received in both of the accidents and then order
the State Insurance Fund to make payments to him f'Or
the rest of his life because he is permanently_ and totally
disabled by reason of the injuries received in both accidents. In other vvords, the Industrial Con1mission can
not a\vard con1pensation to an injured employee upon the
basis of pern1anent total disability, unless the pern1anent
total disability is the result of the accidental injuries
sustained by the employee in the service of the employer
against whon1 the case is being n1ade.
If the injured employee, Mr. James, could be classified as per1nanently and totally disabled, (regardless
of the fact that he is now gainfully employed), as the
result of the injuries received in both his 1939 accident
and in his boyhood accident, he would be entitled to payn1ent for the rest of his life f)}om the Con1bined Injury
Benefit Fund under the provisions of Section 42-1-65;
but he vvould 'not be entitled to any further payn1ent
fron1 the State Insurance Fund.

POINT 2
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECISION
AND ORDER OF NOVEMBER 4, 1948, WAS A FINAL
ORDER, WHICH WE ARE ENTITLED TO HAVE
REVIEWED BY THE SUREME COURT IN THIS
PROCEEDING.
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POINT 3
THE l~Dlr~rJ'RI~-\L COi\l~fiSSION J)ID N01,
HA \'"E JlJRISDICTIO~ TO l\L:\lZE ITS .L-\1IENDE1)
DECISIOX OF XO\"'"l1 ~~1BE11 lG. 1948; TI-IEREFORl~~
TI-1~\T ~-\~1EXl)ED DEC~ISION \\'" ..\S . L\ NtTJ_jLIT)'".
Both of thP~P point~ rt>latt to the Co1n1nission 's pi·oeedure: so \Ye shall discuss th(_}lll together.
1

8eetion -!-~-1-7~ of the \\-r- ork1nen 's
Act proYides :

Con1pen~ation

The po\Yers and jurisdietion of the connnission over each case shall be continuing, and it
Inay fro1n tin1e to tin1e 1nake such n1odification
or change \vith respect to forn1er findings, or
orders \Yith respect thereto, as in its opinion 1na.v
be justified.
In the case of Standard Coal Con~pany vs. Ind.
Contnz., 91 lTtah 549, 65 Pac. (2nd) 640, the Utah Supreme Court quoted this section and then 1nade the follo,ving observation at the botto1n of page 551:
•' This court, ho\vever, has heretofore read
into the foregoing section the liu1itation that tlH~
commission may not resume jurisdiction of a
('ase regularly detern1ined \Vithout son1e change
or ne''T developn1ent in thP injury coinplained of
and not kno\Yn to the parties v\'hen the fornic~r
a\\·ard \\Tas 1nade. There are nun1erous cases suppor,ting that construction of the statute, a1nong
then1 the case of Spring Canyon Coal ('~o. r.s·. Industrial Comrnission, 60 Utah 553, 210 Pac. 611 ~
Salt Lake City ns. Industrial Conunission, 61
Utah 514, 215 Pac. 1047; and other cases that need
not hP ~pPeifeally referred to.''
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In the case of 1ll cLaren vs. Industrial Com mission,
81 Utah 380, 18 Pae. (2nd) 640, the Court's opinion
quotes fron1 the case of Salt Lake City vs. Industrial
Co nt-n~issio Jl) ~upra:
"It rnay often happen that son1e material
change in thP condition of applicant's injury may
occur after an a\vard has been made, in which
justice to one or the other of the parties litigant
n1ight den1and a further hearing of the cause.
It n1ight be that what was supposed to be a serious· or pern1anent injury for "Thich a large colnpesation \vas avvarded would prove _to be only
slight or ten1porary, in \Yhich case the con1pensation should be substantially modified or abrogated altogether; or it n1ight be that the injury
would after,vards prove to. be more serious than
\Vas supposed vvhen the a\vard was n1ade, in which
case the compensation should be increased.''
The case of Utah State Road Commission vs. Industrial Cornntission) 109 Utah 553, 168 Pac. (2nd) 319,
dealt 'vith a different provision of the \V. orkn1en 's Conlpensation La\v than is involved in the case at bar, but
it c-ontained son1e discussion relating to the Industrial
Con1n1ission 's po,vers and procedure, insofar as n1aking
changes and ne\Y orders in cases \vhich have already been
decided. Co1n1nencing a.t the botto1n of page 561, the ·
Court's opinion contains the follo\\ring:
''In this case the Industrial Con1mission had
. a continuing jurisdiction of the subject 1natter and
of the parties, but to 1naterially ch.ange the a\\rard
due process requires previous notice to the parties and a hearing. If ''re hold valid the procedure
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follo,ved in thi.~ ra~~ by. th~ connnission every.
administra ti YP tribunal in pursuane<\ of continuing jurisdiction could tak~ acti~on \Yithout notice
to and hearing of partiP~ inYolYPd \Vith the idea
that if th~ partie~ did not object its order 'vould
stand. If, on th~ other hand, a. party did object
1nerely acting on a petition for rehearing 'vould
correct the error. Such i~ not the la\Y-the rights
of a party entitled to notice and hearing before
decision are not fully protected by notice after
decision and opportunity to request a rehearing.''
It can be seen fron1 the foregoing citations that the
··continuing jurisdiction'' provision of the Workmen's
Compensation La\Y does not give the Industrial ConlInission any legal authority to vacate or annul one of its
o'Yn decisions and to substitute in its place a new or
an1ended decision '\Ti thout prior notice to the parties
concerned, as \Yas done by the Commission in the case at
bar. Consequently the 9ommission's Amended Decision
of Xoven1ber 16, 1948, was a nullity. Our second Application for Rehearing dated December 15, 1948, and the
Industrial Commissi~on 's Order dated December 29, 1948,
attempting to grant a rehearing also should be considered
as nullities. The latest order \vhich the Con1mission made
in this case, 'vhich it had jurisdiction ~to 1nake, \Vas on
'November 4, 1948. We are entitled to have that order
revie\ved by the Supreme Court at this time, inasn1uch
as we have complied with all jurisdictional requiren1ents
-of the s~tatute to obtain this review.
In the case of Callahan vs. Ind. Comn~., 104 Utah
256, 139 Pac. (2nd) 214, this Court discussed the legal
~tatus of a rase after the Industrial Conunission has once
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denied an application for rehearing. ~Larlo\v Callahan
filed an applieation with the Cornn1ission in which he
allege< l tlla t he had sustained a hernia in the course of
l1is e1nployinent. After a hearing, the Co1nn1iss~on denied his elainL On ~July 13, 1942, the applicant filed an
application for a hearing, \vhich vvas denied by the ConlInisRion on J ul~T 16, 1942. On August 13, 1942., he filed
\Yith the Connnission \vhat he tern1ed a '' Supple1nental
J\_pplication for Rehearing~'' and filed vvith it three affidavits referring to additional evidence \Yhich he offered
to produc(\. In ruling upon the effect of this procedure
the Supre1ne C·ourt of Utah, at page 260 of the opinion,
stated as follo,,rs:
"This (Supplemental Application) was silnply a second petition for rehearing for 'vhich
there is no authority in law. The statute above
quoted is jurisdictional, and the Commission was
warranted in disregarding this untin1ely ''Supplelnental Application." Ferguson v. Industrial
Conttrnission, 63 Utah 112, 221 Pac. 1099, "rherein
it is said:
''The first petition for rehearing having been
denied on ~lay 8, 1922, the jurisdiction of the
Industrial Con1n1ission ceased. It vvas then incurnbent upon the applicant to apply to this court
'vithin 30 day~ for a "Trit of revie\Y or to abide
by the decision. Salt Lake C'ity v. Industrial Com;nission, 61 Utah 514, 213 _Pac. 1047."
It is quite clear that the Supre1ne Court has jurisdiction to revievv this case. \\T e feel that after reviewing
it the Court should annul the Industrial Comn1ission's
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decision of November 4, 1948, insofar as it applied to
the State Insurance Fund, and should declare ~the Commission's amended decision of Nove1nber 16, 1948, to be
a nullity.
Respectfully submitted,
F. A. TROTTIER,
Attorney for Plaintiffs.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

